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KEY MESSAGES 
● Political leaders drawing on expertise in a crisis face two temptations: one 
is to dismiss unwelcome expert claims as politically motivated; another is 
to mask expert disagreement altogether. 
● We show that protecting and promoting open disagreement among diverse 
sets of expert advisers can both improve the quality of expert advice and 
make it harder for political leaders to blur the lines between expert advice 
and political judgments. 
● We highlight the importance of institutional design in managing the politics 
of expert advice.
Policymaking During Crises: How Diversity and Disagreement Can Help 
Manage the Politics of Expert Advice 
Standfirst 
Alfred Moore and Michael K. MacKenzie argue that openness about disagreement among 
diverse sets of expert advisers can make it harder for political leaders to politicise expertise, 
and that we should reform expert advisory institutions so as to make public the reasons and 
rationales behind such disagreement. 
Whenever scientists provide advice to political leaders they risk their expert authority being 
used in ways they cannot control in order to serve political ends. At one extreme, when they 
give unwelcome advice they risk being dismissed on the grounds that they must be taking 
sides. At the other extreme, expert authority can be used to shield political leaders from re-
sponsibility. The UK government, for example, has repeatedly insisted that they have simply 
been Òfollowing the scienceÓ when making decisions during the COVID-19 pandemic, even 
though experts do not speak with one voice and scientific facts, alone, cannot determine 
how political (or ethical or moral) judgments should be made.  
These two extreme responses Ñ ostentatious dismissal of expert advice and ostentatious 
deference to it Ñ work by denying the importance of legitimate disagreement and uncertain-
ty. In the first case, disagreement is dismissed as being politically motivated. In the second, 
disagreement is masked altogether. Both temptations are strong when decision-makers 
come under pressure, as they do during crisis situations. 
While many have (rightly) focused on the ethos and duties of experts in political contexts (1, 
2), we focus on the role that political institutions can play in helping to more effectively and 
legitimately manage the politics of expertise. Drawing on findings from behavior research, 
we identify two principles to guide the institutionalization of expert advice. The first involves 
ensuring that diverse perspectives Ñ both disciplinary and social Ñ are adequately repre-
sented when expert advice is given and consulted. The second has to do with protecting, 
promoting, and normalizing disagreement among diverse sets of experts.  We then propose 
three ways that these principles might be integrated and institutionalized into political sys-
tems. 
Principle 1: Inclusion of Diverse Perspectives  
Expert advice should draw on diverse disciplinary specialisms and diverse social perspect-
ives. Disciplinary diversity is important for two reasons. First, it can improve the quality of 
collective judgments and help avoid epistemic pitfalls. Among those pitfalls are the tendency 
for some experts to become Òprisoners of their preconceptionsÓ in a way that leads to poor 
predictions, a refusal to acknowledge mistakes, and dismissal of dissonant evidence (3). 
Another risk involves failing to recognize and question implicit shared assumptions, leading 
to incomplete examination of policies, selective bias in identifying and processing informa-
tion, and inadequate consideration of alternatives (4). More positively, including diverse dis-
ciplinary perspectives can lead to better inferences and more accurate predications (5). In-
clusive deliberative processes can also help participants separate good arguments from bad 
ones and identify better solutions or more diverse options (6). 
Second, the inclusion of diverse disciplinary perspectives can help legitimize political deci-
sions and encourage public compliance with rules and regulations. Diverse groups are better 
able to identify affected Ñ or potentially affected Ñ interests and show how those interests 
may be adequately addressed when policy decisions are made. Unlike experts who must 
make issue-specific recommendations based on their own expertise, political leaders must 
balance many different, often irreconcilable, interests against each other. If political leaders 
take advice only from certain types of experts they may fail to adequately consider (or even 
recognize) how diverse groups of people will be affected by their decisions. During the 
COVID-19 pandemic, political leaders in the United States and the United Kingdom have 
relied on advice primarily from medical experts (physicians, virologists, and epidemiologists), 
which is understandable during a health crisis (7, 8). But advice from those experts should 
be considered alongside input from other types of experts such as economists, psycholo-
gists, sociologists, educators, and child-welfare advocates. These (and other) experts are 
needed because the drastic actions that have been taken to limit the spread of the virus 
have consequences that reach well beyond the expertise of infectious disease specialists. 
Diversity with respect to social knowledge, lived experiences, and perspectives (9) is also 
important in the formation of expert advice. If those making judgments share certain charac-
teristics, such as gender, age, race, home-ownership, or wealth, they may fail to recognize 
how the costs of policies (such as stay-at-home orders) are likely to affect those who do not 
share those characteristics; they might recognize those costs and consider them to some 
extent but they will not feel those consequences of their decisions. The inclusion of diverse 
disciplinary and social perspectives can therefore help sharpen a sense of the stakes, which 
can, in turn, appropriately inform political judgment.   
Principle 2: Open Disagreement 
The epistemic and political benefits of disciplinary diversity are widely recognized, if not al-
ways practiced. The case for open disagreement among experts Ñ especially during crises 
Ñ is more often resisted. In the UK, the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE), 
for instance, includes people from many different disciplinary backgrounds, but its member-
ship was initially kept secret. The assumption is that experts Ñ when engaged in giving pub-
lic policy advice Ñ should not be open about their uncertainties: they need to project certain-
ty and unanimity in order to maintain authority and trust in the eyes of the public. The evi-
dence, however, suggests otherwise. A recent study found that providing people with pre-
cise, numerical estimates of uncertainty increased their awareness of the uncertainties in-
volved in public policy decisions on topics such as climate change and immigration, but it did 
not lead to any appreciable reductions in levels of public trust or increased mistrust of the 
sources of the information (10). 
There are both epistemic and political reasons to encourage open, adversarial exchanges 
among diverse experts in policy making processes. From an epistemic perspective, diversity, 
itself, is not sufficient to develop and test strong arguments. Experts, like the rest of us, need 
to have their arguments actively challenged if they are to avoid the cognitive pitfalls associ-
ated with overconfidence. Disagreements among experts (and others) can help draw out im-
plicit value commitments, disciplinary assumptions, and blind spots. Disagreement Ñ even if 
it is only for the sake of disagreement Ñ can also help support the thorough exploration of 
rival positions. This idea, which was famously advanced by the philosopher John Stuart Mill, 
finds support in recent research in behavioral science suggesting that adversarial argumen-
tation helps diverse groups do a better job of evaluating arguments both for and against giv-
en propositions (11). 
Open disagreement also has at least two positive political functions. First, open disagree-
ment can make it harder for political leaders to blur the lines between expert advice and po-
litical judgments. Political leaders considering, say, whether to mandate the wearing of face 
masks, will find it harder to use experts as a shield for unpopular decisions when the ratio-
nales and justifications behind expert disagreements Ñ about, for instance, the assumptions 
used in modelling the effects of face masks on rates of transmission Ñ are made public. 
Second, being open about disagreements among experts, and the levels of uncertainty that 
their judgments entail, can help political leaders to reverse course when necessary without 
seeming like they are being inconsistent or capitulating to political and thus unscientific de-
mands. When political leaders openly discuss counterarguments and acknowledge the legit-
imacy of minority judgments, it helps keep alive reasons both for and against particular deci-
sions, and this can make it easier for political leaders Ñ and the publics they serve Ñ to jus-
tify revising or reversing previous policy decisions (12). The possibility of justifying policy re-
versals is important at the best of times, but it is crucial during rapidly evolving crises Ñ 
such as the COVID-19 pandemic Ñ that are characterized by deep uncertainties.  
Institutional Responses 
There are several ways that these two principles might be institutionalized, departing less or 
more dramatically from established practices. Within existing expert committee structures, 
one option would be to introduce minority reports. Rather than publishing committee deliber-
ations Ñ which could make experts reticent to express themselves honestly while increasing 
the likelihood of inaccurate information being disseminated Ñ expert committees might be 
required to publish carefully crafted statements from different minority perspectives. In this 
way, reasons both for and against particular pieces of policy advice could be made public 
but the risks of misinterpretation and misrepresentation would be minimized. Another option 
would be for experts to form collective judgments by voting. Expert committees of the US 
National Institutions of Health, for instance, have held votes on whether a substance can be 
reasonably considered to be a carcinogen, and these processes have revealed disciplinary 
differences in judgments about risk (13). Public debates and voting among experts would 
help communicate disagreements where they exist, reveal disciplinary tendencies (or bias-
es) and keep potentially credible counterarguments alive in policy processes, all while help-
ing to filter out less credible or extreme claims or considerations. 
Another option would take the selection of relevant experts out of the hands of political lead-
ers or executives by adopting standing committees of experts, using legislative assemblies 
as a model. Such committees would comprise experts from many different disciplines, and 
their deliberations and voting processes would be public. Political leaders are typically free 
to choose to listen to whichever experts they wish and this often limits the diversity of the 
expertise they seek and receive. A standing committee of experts would help solve this prob-
lem by empowering diverse and independent experts to speak and influence political leaders 
and publics before any situations arise where their expertise may be needed. On this model, 
the experts, themselves, would decide whether they have relevant expertise in any particular 
situations, but in contrast to standing bodies designed to report expert consensus (14), this 
body would serve to pluralise credible expert input. 
A third option would be to encourage competing groups of experts to contribute to policy de-
bates in structured or organized ways. Many experts have provided advice during the 
COVID-19 pandemic, but we have little idea of their influence or how different (often compet-
ing) pieces of advice should be weighed against each other. It would be possible to make 
these processes more cohesive using a tribunal model, where rival experts would be em-
powered to question each other directly before an audience of experts from both within and 
outside their own areas of speciality (15). Expert claims might also be adversarially exam-
ined before lay publics on the model of the 19th century coronerÕs courts in the UK (16). This 
approach would help ensure that policy advice is sufficiently sensitive to the diverse lived 
experiences of affected publics. 
Conclusion 
We have argued that creating institutions that establish norms and expectations of legitimate 
disagreement as part of the process of forming and communicating expert advice would 
make it easier for experts to stay true to their expertise and harder for politicians to hide their 
judgments behind Ôthe science’. The principles and institutions we discuss in this article are, 
of course, not a magic bullet: their effectiveness will depend to a large extent on the political 
environments into which expert advice is inserted. At the same time, they would help make 
those political environments more receptive to expert advice by minimizing the opportunities 
that political leaders have to distort that advice or simply defer to it for their own partisan 
purposes. Our proposals can thus be seen as one step towards enhancing the quality of 
public deliberation and, ultimately, political judgment, in our political systems by encouraging 
an attitude not of blind deference to the science but of allegiance to the norms of science 
itself: a respect for diversity of opinion and the value of disagreement in processes of inquiry.  
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